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THE RULE OF LAW IN THE TRIAL COURT
Robert P. Burns*
INTRODUCTION
Is the American trial courtroom a dangerous place for the rule of
law? Certainly, the concerns expressed about the decline of the rule
of law in America have often focused on the trial court. Critics argue
that trial practices and rhetoric systematically undermine the rule of
law. This notion has been fueled by sensationalist media coverage of
notorious criminal trials and public relations campaigns against trial
lawyers and trial practices. The latter are so skillful that they have, to
some extent, achieved the remarkable feat of convincing the same
Americans who serve on juries that they ought not to be trusted to
make important decisions. A number of academic and professional
authors have, in different ways, attacked the trial court's alleged indif-
ference to the rule of law and the values associated with it.
All of this should be quite shocking. After all, one very powerful
perspective-what I have called "the received view"-understands
the trial court as the very institution designed to realize the rule of law
in situations where there are disputes of fact.1 The parliamentary as-
pects of trial procedure, including the orderly sequence of presenta-
tion and rebuttal, assure the rational evaluation of factual and legal
issues.2 Many of the requirements of the law of evidence, such as au-
thentication 3 and the rule against hearsay,4 have been thought to en-
hance factual accuracy. The judge's authority to grant directed
verdicts 5 and appellate review of jury verdicts have been thought to
ensure that a jury's decisions are consistent with the rule of law.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 10-33 (1999).
2. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366-67 (1978)
("[Adjudication] assumes a burden of rationality not borne by any other form of social ordering.
A decision which is the product of reasoned argument must be prepared itself to meet the test of
reason. We demand of an adjudicative decision a kind of rationality we do not expect of the
results of contract or of voting.").
3. FED. R. EVID. 901-903.
4. FED. R. EVID. 801-807.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 50; Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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Moreover, the evidentiary doctrine of materiality requires that
every piece of evidence offered has a pedigree provided by its logical
link to one of the norms embedded in the jury instructions, thereby
minimizing the influence of other norms that immaterial evidence im-
plicitly invokes. 6 The generative evidentiary principle that witnesses
must testify in the language of perception (and not offer opinions and
interpretations) honors both factual accuracy and respect for the law.
Perceptions are more likely to be accurate than self-indulgent opinion
evidence; 7 perceptions are also more plastic to the norms embedded
in the substantive law because they are value-free. 8 Indeed, the archi-
tecture of the Anglo-American trial seems to be the result of the very
practical utopianism of bench and bar in creating a forum within
which the rule of law can prevail. Has it completely failed?
I argue here that it has not. I begin with a description of the alter-
native method of decisionmaking with which the trial implicitly is
compared unfavorably-"bureaucratic-formalist" decisionmaking. I
recall the moderate Realist critique of the claims to lawfulness of that
style. Because general rules do not decide particular cases, something
other than the rules determines judgment in specific cases.
The Realists concluded that the judge's response to "the facts of the
case" was generally the determinative factor. But, I suggest, it makes
a good deal of difference how "the facts" are presented to the deci-
sionmaker. If the case is presented in a manner that flattens out the
record and avoids its narrative and dramatic elements, the result will
be left to the undisciplined subjectivity of the decisionmaker, and to
the "attitudes" which political scientists find best predict appellate
decisionmaking. I also suggest that there is a kind of deep necessity
here: the attempt to eliminate the role of common-sense moral judg-
ment in legal decisionmaking can generate, not a higher level of law-
fulness, but greater arbitrariness in deciding concrete cases.
The trial allows for a fairer tension between the instrumental or bu-
reaucratic function of legal rules and the aspiration to justice in partic-
ular cases and, paradoxically, achieves a higher level of lawfulness. To
say that the trial may be "vanishing" implies a loss of lawfulness. Fi-
nally, I consider two critiques of the contemporary trial that focus on
its failure to achieve "truth" in the sense of factual accuracy. I con-
6. FED. R. EviD. 401.
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54-55 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) ("As long as the
connection subsists between [man's] reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will
have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will
attach themselves.").
8. BURNS, supra note 1, at 15-26.
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cede that the major failure of the trial's concrete lawfulness may stem
from its dependence on pretrial practices that distort "brutally ele-
mentary fact." I conclude by raising a number of questions about how
to move forward.
II. THE BUREAUCRATIC-FORMALIST VISION OF THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE "FAILURE" OF THE TRIAL COURT
Implicit in the attack on the trial court is the notion that other
modes of "dispute resolution" or "social ordering" must be more
"lawful" than the methods of the trial court.9 Rules do not apply
themselves; in the words of the great judge, "General propositions do
not decide concrete cases."' 1 Any critique of the trial court must ad-
vocate some alternative kind of process.I
This necessarily comparative feature of one's assessment of lawful-
ness raises some basic problems. There are a number of recurring
rhetorical patterns that interfere with understanding and that are
prominent here. One is what I call "the fallacy of mixed ideality. ' 12
Here, an idealized version of an alternative method is compared to
the concrete and flawed method under scrutiny.
A related problem involves criticizing an imperfect aspect of prac-
tice while ignoring an equally flawed, counterbalancing practice. The
adversary system has evolved as a pattern of specific ad hoc reforms
designed to counter the profound unfairness of prosecution-oriented
English criminal procedure.1 3 It is not only in evidence law where "an
irrational advantage to one side is offset by a ... counterprivilege to
the other" and where "reforming" only one aspect of our practice "is
more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse inter-
ests than to establish a rational edifice."'1 4 For example, the role that
criminal defense lawyers have in preparing their clients for trial must
be balanced against the role of the police in investigation and interro-
9. There is also a line of criticism of the trial court from the other direction. Some proponents
of mediation object that the trial court can be too "legalistic" or "formalistic." This complaint
about formalism is sometimes combined with a complaint about the adversarial nature of the
trial court. See generally DISPUTE PROCESSING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY, PRAC-
TICE AND POLICY (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2003).
10. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11. In the polemical literature, these alternatives are rarely described concretely. Typically a
court that "follows the law" is contrasted favorably with one that "ignores the law" or, worse,
"legislates." See Tony Freyer, Individual Rights, Judicial Discretion, and Judge Frank M. John-
son, Jr., 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 523, 564 (1995).
12. Robert P. Burns, Fallacies on Fallacies: A Reply, 3 INT'L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE (2005),
http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol3/issl/art4.
13. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 253-55 (2003).
14. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) (discussing evidentiary rules).
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gation. This does not mean that reform is impossible. But we must
not forget that key conservative insight: how much effort it takes to
keep things from getting worse.
More globally, one has to evaluate the appropriateness of a less ad-
versarial form of trial procedure in light of our broader institutions.
Of the world's large countries, we are probably the most capitalist,
and we are relatively unencumbered by state welfare institutions. Our
corporate executives have incentives to maximize short-term profits
and have few obligations to other "stakeholders." The public rela-
tions machinery is sophisticated and wholly instrumental. Our politics
are dominated by powerful interest groups that gain a disproportion-
ate hold on scientifically gerrymandered legislatures, as they did in the
Gilded Age. 15 This style of politics is likely to extend to elected
judges, as more restrictions on advertising and campaigning are
lifted. 16 The trial, and especially the "populism" of the jury trial, has
always been envisioned as a partial counterbalance to these aspects of
our national life.' 7
Further, all societies divide their lives into discontinuous social
spheres-economy, neighborhood, school, church, family, and so on.
In America, these discontinuities are at their sharpest. One does not
have to be a relativist to say that in our society there will be a broader
range of perspectives and "truths" than in (even somewhat) more or-
ganic societies. To a larger extent than in more organic societies, for
us, "justice is conflict." 18 That is, justice is achieving the fairest ten-
sion among incommensurable norms, each of which finds its natural
home in one aspect of our social life and whose extension to other
realms is likely to be contested.
More than our European cousins, 19 it may be important to us that
parties invoking the values of these conflicting spheres be able to tell
15. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955).
16. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (striking, on First Amend-
ment grounds, traditional limitations on judicial campaign speech).
17. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
96-104 (1998); CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DE-
MOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 66-101 (2001). See generally Robert P.
Burns, The History and Theory of the American Jury, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1477 (1995) (book re-
view); Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 Wis. L.
REV. 377; Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 877 (1999); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
18. See STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000).
19. See generally MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUrHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986).
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their own stories in court. It may also be appropriate that parties have
more control over the evidence they present than they do in Europe.
These are normative as well as descriptive issues. In a sufficiently in-
dividualist and adversarial society, a justice system that is not adver-
sarial20 will likely ease the imposition of the will of socially dominant
groups-the "tyranny of the effective majority," if you will. This ten-
sion between law as the instrument for social control by dominant
groups-put more darkly, Thrasymachus's "will of the stronger" 2 1-
and law as a medium for the realization of the justice revealed by its
internal practices has been a recurring theme in our history and the
nature of the trial has often been a focus of that controversy. 22 The
appropriate procedures for applying the law of rules have often
seemed discontinuous with the procedures that will allow "true law"
to emerge.
Although the phrase is seldom used because of its negative conno-
tations, the critics most often attack the trial court for failing to em-
ploy purely bureaucratic-formalistic modes of social ordering.23
Bureaucratic modes of social ordering are justified as being the most
efficient devices for achieving legislatively predetermined goals and
"exclude questions of value or preference as obviously irrelevant to
the administrative task, and ... view reliance on nonreplicable, nonre-
viewable judgment or intuition as a singularly unattractive methodol-
ogy for decision."'24 The dispassionate bureaucrat who mechanically
20. It is true that there is no one "adversary system." Although the American system is gen-
erally the most adversarial, that does not mean that we have not incorporated various aspects of
"inquisitorial" systems within our practice or that we should not. As I noted above, it simply
counsels caution. For an interesting set of proposals to increase accuracy in criminal adjudica-
tion by a scholar who appreciates the power of adversary presentation, see Darryl K. Brown,
The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 1585 (2005).
21. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1974).
22. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975). For a jurisprudential reflection on
the limits of the law of rules' claim to be "law," see Marianne Constable, Laying Aside the Law:
The Silences of Presumptive Positivism, in RULES AND REASONING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
FRED SCHAUER 61 (Linda Meyer ed., 1999).
23. Roberto Mangabeira Unger notes that the combination of bureaucratic and formalistic
understandings of law was a product of the nineteenth century and that the combination pro-
duced what we know as a "legal system." Formalism added the ideals of generality and consis-
tency to older bureaucratic methods. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN
SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 48, 50-54 (1976). On formal justice, see
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971).
24. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 26 (1983). Rules enable a ruler to communicate abstract features of the ruler's will to an
2007]
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applies the rules, regardless of context or consequences, often seems
to be the ideal against lawfulness of which trial processes are found
wanting.
Bureaucratic adjudication often has, at least on the rhetorical level,
a higher level of "rule-centeredness" than the efforts of our trial
courts. Bureaucratic methods embody what Professor James White
has argued is an impoverished understanding of legal processes as a
machine designed to stamp fully predetermined goals on plastic mate-
rial in a wholly instrumental way. 25 For that kind of enterprise, the
individual case should be presented through processes that screen out
life-world values and that avoid the more interpretive and evaluative
language with which we usually describe human events. From a com-
mon-sense point of view, this means that only the language of power
or will that is embodied in legislative or administrative rules will sup-
ply the norms for evaluating a particular case. The facts of the case
should not "talk back" to the rules.26
Though it would be laborious to demonstrate in general terms,27 the
bureaucratic-formalistic project can never be fully realized. That is
the weight of the argument made by realists of one stripe or another
for a hundred years. Some third thing, between the rule and a value-
free account of "the facts," is necessary to complete the judgment. It
will come either from the values embedded in the languages and per-
formances of the process by which the adjudicator is exposed to the
concrete case, or it will come from the decisionmaker's subjectivity.
Although the proposition is controversial, many political scientists
who study appellate decisionmaking tell us that the judge's "atti-
tude"-a complex of very general sensibilities, political leanings, and
moral commitments-really determines or completes the judgment in
a particular case.28
army of enforcers, but the rule of law can then take on a momentum of its own because of its
internal ideals.
25. JAMES BOYD WHITE, Teaching Law and Literature, in FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERI-
ENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION 73, 88 (1999).
26. It is no accident then that Hannah Arendt classically described bureaucratic modes of
social ordering as "rule by nobody." HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958). Our
selves are constituted by the moral judgments we make. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE
SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 25-52 (1989). Concretely, in avoiding the
description of the case before him in any languages other than that supplied by the rules, and in
particular avoiding simple everyday language, the bureaucrat is bracketing his moral self. At an
extreme, he will find himself speaking in Orwellian terms with Kafkaesque results.
27. See generally Robert P. Burns, The Distinctiveness of Trial Narrative, in 1 THE TRIAL ON
TRIAL: TRUTH AND DUE PROCESS 157 (Antony Duff et al. eds., 2004).
28. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE A-ri-
TUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting
[Vol. 56:307
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The formalist model of adjudication has undergone withering and
recurring criticism for seventy-five years.29 A crucial principle in for-
malist self-understanding-the distinction between law and fact-has
been criticized as a purely pragmatic fiction. 30 Viewed in institutional
terms, it has served only to allocate increasing decisionmaking power
to the judge, who increasingly acts in summary fashion. 31 If the cri-
tique of formalism is even partially correct, how do our judicial bu-
reaucrats actually decide the truly debatable cases that come to them?
To the extent that our judges are becoming more comfortable as bu-
reaucrats, we are likely to see fewer trials. 32 That is because bureau-
crats do not need to engage in the process of moral judgment that has
traditionally been at the heart of trial and common-law litigation as a
whole.
Professor Jerry Mashaw contrasts bureaucracy with traditional adju-
dication and argues that the paradigmatic task of the latter is the 
reso-
lution of initially and generally plausible claims about rights.3
3
Typically, each of the parties to an adjudication can invoke some right
that has a place in society's moral landscape. The task is then to re-
solve the tensions between the competing principles in the crucible of
the concrete case. 34 This is certainly true when the legal rule itself
invokes an open-textured standard such as "reasonableness," and it
remains true across a whole range of other situations, such as in crimi-
nal cases, which require an evaluation of the defendant's mental
state.35 Mashaw concedes the partial overlap of bureaucratic rational-
ity and adjudicatory fairness:
To some degree these traditional notions of justice in adjudica-
tory process imply merely getting the facts right in order to apply
existing legal rules. So conceived, the goal of a moral judgment
model of justice is the same as that of a bureaucratic rationality
Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).
29. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEx. L.
REV. 267 (1997).
30. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1769 (2003).
31. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
32. Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983); Stephen
C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631.
33. MASHAW, supra note 24, at 29-31.
34. Id. at 29 ("Property claims of 'It has been in my family for generations' confront counter-
claims of 'I bought it from a dealer' or 'I have made productive use of it'; 'The smell of your
turkey farm is driving me mad' confronts 'I was here first.'").
35. Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the Rehnquist Court:
The Sluggish Life of Political Factfinding, 94 GEo. L.J. 1589, 1603-06 (2006).
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model-factually correct realization of previously validated legal
norms. If this conception exhausted the notion of adjudicatory fair-
ness, moral judgment's competition with bureaucratic rationality
would entail merely a technical dispute about the most efficient way
to find facts. But there is more to the competition than that.36
The "more" is that the process of adjudication is partly value-defin-
ing. The definition occurs in the process of "contextualized explora-
tion of individual deservingness. ' ' 37 At trial, this means two rather
distinct things. One is that the parties and the procedural rules limit
the range of morally relevant facts, because the goal is "to resolve
particular claims of entitlement in a way that fairly allocates certain
benefits and burdens, not to allocate benefits and burdens in gen-
eral."' 38 A second point, one that Mashaw does not emphasize but
which is characteristic of the American trial, is that the inquiry that
takes place at trial focuses on the concrete, the factual, and the multi-
ple to an almost obsessive degree-one almost completely discontinu-
ous with most other inquiries.39 That is the kind of inquiry that should
determine the relative reach or significance of the competing and in-
evitably overgeneralized rules or principles that make up both our
moral and legal sources. After a certain point, indeterminacy is usu-
ally a welcome aspect of legal rules because they can never completely
anticipate the normatively relevant aspects of the situations to which
they will be applied.40 According to White, a statute can be better
understood as an important first assertion in a conversation than as a
fully determinate expression of sovereign will.41
What do we actually do at trial? We tell different sorts of sharply
constrained stories, then criticize them, and then partially reconstruct
them. So, mercifully, decision at trial is not about who is the better
storyteller. It is true that trial decisionmaking draws on the moral
sources inherent in the judge's and jury's common sense and experi-
ence, and that those sources are realized through the narrative struc-
tures of the trial. But there are at least two competing stories told at
trial. Even within each case, narrative structures are hybrid: the fully
36. MASHAW, supra note 24, at 29 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 30.
38. Id.
39. BURNS, supra note 1, at 125-30.
40. The law of evidence has certainly recognized this issue. Our evidence "codes" actually
function as a set of relatively broad guidelines to structure the judge's sense of fairness in regu-
lating the trial. See generally Robert P. Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L.
REV. 69 (2001) [hereinafter Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law].
41. JAMES BOYD WHITE, How Should We Talk About Corporations?, in FROM EXPECTATION
TO EXPERIENCE, supra note 25, at 111, 113; see also ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT
THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 87 (2003).
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characterized God's-eye narrative of opening statements stands in
harsh contrast to the artificially stripped-down and perceptual narra-
tives of direct examination. The tension between what each lawyer
says "this case is about" in the opening statement and the actual testi-
mony presented to support the case can be revealing. This tension
reveals the appropriate reach of the "general propositions" that do
not decide cases, but do structure them. The trial proceeds not only
by the construction of narrative, but also by its deconstruction through
rebuttal, cross-examination, and argument.
The trial is also a dramatic event constituted by the confrontation of
actors in different roles: lawyers and lawyers, lawyers and witnesses,
lawyers and judges, and lawyers and juries. This confrontation of
roles is revealing. It limits the inevitably overgeneralized rules and
normative scripts to which each party will necessarily appeal. It al-
lows the judge or jury to see which case "rings true." It serves not
only as a "critique" of law, as Professor David Luban has put it,42 but
also as a critique of common sense. The trial refines the law and com-
mon sense by confronting generalization with the meaningful detail of
past events in ways that our mass media almost never do. This may
explain the feeling of an "elevation" of common sense that jurors
often describe.43
What does the social science literature say about decisionmaking in
the trial court? Certain recurring conclusions emerge from the vast
literature. "[J]urors are deeply engaged with the evidence, and their
verdicts emerge from that engagement, '44 what Professor Jeffrey Ab-
ramson has called "the discipline of the evidence. ' 45 Broad demo-
graphic characteristics of jurors do not predict verdicts.46 Juries rarely
exercise their power of nullification, and there is a high level of con-
vergence between what juries and what judges believe is the legally
correct result.47 This convergence probably stems from the general
congruence between democratically enacted law and societal norms
that a cross-sectional jury is likely to apply in a case even in the ab-
sence of instructions. 48 Professors Harry Kalven Jr. and Hans Zeisel
found that judges and juries agree in the dispositions of cases about
42. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 385 (1994).
43. See June Louin Tapp, Megan Gunnar & Daniel Keating, Socialization: Three Ages, Three
Rule Systems, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 42, 62-73 (Daniel Perlman & P. Chris Cozby eds., 1983).
44. BURNS, supra note 1, at 143.
45. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
162 (1994).
46. BURNS, supra note 1, at 143 (citing ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 143-76).
47. Id. at 144.
48. Id. (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 495-96 (1966)).
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seventy-five percent of the time-a figure which probably understates
the convergence. 49 The jury's "war with the law is thus both modest
and subtle."'50 The level of convergence does not increase with the
complexity of cases, a conclusion which Kalven and Zeisel interpreted
as a "stunning refutation of the hypothesis that the jury does not un-
derstand [difficult cases]." 51 Disagreements between judges and juries
stem mainly from the ways in which different values affect the fact-
finding process itself. This is, in part, because "a jury's approach to
the evidence is 'equitable' rather than 'rule-oriented,"' and the con-
siderations that "explain" trial decisions do not fit exclusively within
the categories defined by the instructions. 52 For reasons grounded in
the nature of trial practices and languages, the judge and jury make
detailed distinctions based on many levels of moral, legal, and political
evaluation: "In the world of jury behavior, fact-finding and value
judgments are subtly intertwined.' ' 53 The decisionmaker at trial or-
ganizes evidence in narrative form, not as a series of links in a logical
chain that leads to the categories in the jury instructions. These narra-
tives "have the capacity to create clear interpretations for social be-
havior-interpretations that might not have been obvious outside the
story context. ' 54 These stories bring with them "an ethics already re-
alized," 55 in the common sense and social practices of the deci-
sionmaker who determines how legal rules will be applied. These
norms are not arbitrary and they are enormously more refined than
the very broad "attitudes" that often make the difference in bureau-
cratic decisionmaking.
These social-scientific findings regarding the process of trial adjudi-
cation are consistent with the accounts that experienced judges and
lawyers have given. The major Legal Realists agreed that the law of
rules "obscured more than it explained about why a court decided as
it did,"56 and that "judges react primarily to the underlying facts of the
case, rather than to applicable legal rules and reasons (the latter figur-
49. Id. at 144-45.
50. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 48, at 495.
51. Id. at 157.
52. BURNS. supra note 1, at 146 (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 48, at 76, 495).
53. KALVEN & ZEISEL. supra note 48, at 164.
54. W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCrING REALITY IN THE COURT-
ROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 7 (1981) (emphasis added).
55. Robert P. Burns, A Conservative Perspective on the Future of the American Jury Trial, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1319, 1335 (2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Peter Kemp, Ethics & Narra-
tivity. in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR 371, 376 (Lewis Edwin Hahn ed.. 1995)).
56. L.A. Powe. Jr.. Justice Douglas After Fifty Years: The First Amendment, McCarthyism and
Rights. 6 CONST. COMMENT. 267. 271 (1989).
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ing primarily as ways of providing post-hoc rationales for decisions
reached on other grounds). '57
As Jerome Frank has pointed out, Chancellor Kent stated that "[h]e
first made himself master of the facts" and then "[he] saw where jus-
tice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time; [he] then
sat down to search the authorities ... but [he] almost always found
principles suited to [his] view of the case."'58 Judge Joseph Hutcheson
floridly described "hunching" his way to a conclusion: "I ... wait for
the feeling, the hunch-that intuitive flash of understanding which
makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision, and
at the point where the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its
light along the way."'59 This is all consistent with the observations of
the kinds of cognitive operations that actually take place at trial.
Some "honest and sensible judgments" are tacit: "They express an
intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many un-
named and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie beneath
consciousness without losing their worth. ' 60 They are mainly integra-
tive, not deductive:
The jury's evaluation of the evidence relevant to a material proposi-
tion requires a gestalt or synthesis which seldom needs to be ana-
lyzed precisely. Any item of evidence must be interpreted in the
context of all the evidence introduced .... In giving appropriate, if
sometimes unreflective, weight to a specific piece of evidence the
trier will fit it into a shifting mosaic.61
Noted trial attorney Louis Nizer put it as follows:
Although jurors are extraordinarily right in their conclusion, it is
usually based on common sense "instincts" about right and wrong,
and not on sophisticated evaluations of complicated testimony....
[A] Judge, trying a case without a jury, may believe that his decision
is based on refined weighing of the evidence; but... he, too, has an
over-all, almost compulsive "feeling" about who is right or wrong
and then supports this conclusion with legal technology. 62
That we are not consciously following rules at trial does not mean
that our practices are not consistent with rules: "[W]e seem to be able
to participate deftly in rule-governed practices, even intellectual prac-
57. Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1148 (1999) (re-
viewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).
58. Leiter, supra note 29, at 276 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 104 n.* (1930)).
59. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929).
60. Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
61. United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (Weinstein, J.).
62. Louis NIZER, My LIFE IN COURT 313 (1961).
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tices, without consciously directing our actions by an ongoing inter-
pretation and application of the rule."' 63 To give a mundane example,
the appropriate use of our native language in social situations reflects
a tacit and practical "knowing how" that rarely adheres to the rules of
grammar: "Each seeks to account for successful judgment in terms of
an ineluctable grounding in social or communal contexts. Illocution-
ary force operates on the basis of tacit conventions that interlocutors
share by virtue of being part of the same linguistic community." 64 As
I have previously argued, we should reject accounts of language com-
prehension that consider it to be a kind of inference:
Students of language have come to see ... that we consistently un-
derstand what others mean in daily conversation through an instan-
taneous grasp of the contexts within which statements are made and
the background conditions against which they are made. That kind
of grasp or integration cannot be reduced to representation, defini-
tion, and inference but requires a tacit grasp of the situation as a
whole and the human context of linguistic performances. 65
Professor Peter Steinberger notes that "reliable and accurate judg-
ment is often a matter of invoking, however automatically and uncon-
sciously, the range of norms, assumptions, conceptual materials, and
rhetorical tools that constitute the linguistic/intellectual community of
which one is a part."'66
The trial narratives we use do not imprison us. We are not enclosed
within the stories we tell, but can counter story with story, to remind
ourselves of the inevitable gap between events and the telling of those
events. More importantly, we can place different kinds of stories in
tension with one another. In particular, we can contrast the fully char-
acterized narratives of opening and closing statements with the more
spartan and perceptual stories of direct examination. The issues are
(1) who should be entrusted with the task of moving in the space be-
tween the general rules and the particular narratives of the individual
case, and (2) how, and under what procedures, should that movement
take place. It is by dwelling in this tension that an integrative judg-
ment can emerge that accounts for all the facts, norms, and possibili-
ties. The "consciously structured hybrid of languages and practices"
that prevails in the trial court, even while respectful of the law of
rules, inevitably allows the judge or jury to see, to feel, and to be ab-
63. BURNS, supra note 1, at 205.
64. PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE CONCEPT OF POLITCAL JUDGMENT 185 (1993).
65. BURNS, supra note 1, at 204.
66. Id. at 206 (quoting STEINBERGER, supra note 64, at 185).
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sorbed in a broader range of moral sources than the bureaucrat would
ever allow. 67
This is not to say that the law of rules is unrepresented in the trial
court. Dispositive motion practice screens out many civil cases from
coming to trial. The doctrine of materiality insists on a pedigree of
every piece of evidence in the form of a link to the law of rules. Jury
instructions are given with some solemnity and are supported by the
jury's oath. But they are simply one normative source among others.
Those other sources will shape the law of rules in a range of different
and complex ways, from affecting the way in which the law of rules is
interpreted or applied, all the way to the relatively rare jury
nullification.
This does not mean that legal rules are irrelevant to adjudication.
Rules structure the absorbing event that is the trial in a number of
important ways. 68 The issues here are more subtle. One can approach
the model of rule application suggested by bureaucratic rationality
only by impoverishing both the normative and factual sides of rule
application and eliminating the richness that we generally believe nec-
essary for just outcomes. Regardless of the philosophical issues, how-
ever, neither the judge engaging in summary or appellate disposition
of a case, nor the judge or jury deciding a case at trial, is deciding the
case mechanically. It is not true in either case that "judges exercise no
discretion and that they do not render decisions by reasoning in ways
that are not sanctioned by legal reasons. '69
If the law of rules provides only some of the normative sources for
decision at trial, does that mean that the rule of law is threatened? To
answer this question, one must first ask a more fundamental question:
"What is law?" Some scholars believe that this question ought not be
asked, because it leads to more confusion than it is worth. For exam-
ple, the classic controversy between Ronald Dworkin and H.L.A.
Hart about the meaning or content of law seems to have more to do
with the relative power of two different modes of legal theory, one
seeking solely to describe legal materials and the other arguing that
such description is not possible without some implicit evaluation of
those materials. Hart responded to Dworkin's theory:
The central task of legal theory so conceived is termed by Dworkin
"interpretive" and is partly evaluative, since it consists in the identi-
67. Id. at 183.
68. Robert P. Burns, How Law Knows in the American Trial Court, in How LAW KNOWS 126
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007).
69. Robert P. Burns, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 58 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 205, 227
(2001) (citing Leiter, supra note 57, at 1145).
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fication of the principles which both best "fit" or cohere with the
settled law and legal practices of a legal system and also provide the
best moral justification for them, thus showing the law "in its best
light." For Dworkin, the principles thus identified are not only parts
of a theory of the law but are also implicit parts of the law itself.70
Only by including those principles within the law does legal deci-
sionmaking in concrete cases become something other than arbi-
trary-the exercise of a discretion that is the expression of the judge's
subjectivity. Those principles allow judges to decide each case in a
way that is uniquely consistent with the law as a whole, understood in
its best light. The practices of the trial perform the same determining
function "from below." The shape of trial practices constitutes an ex-
pression of "considered judgments of justice," determinations on im-
portant matters that are relatively long-standing and in which we have
confidence 71 because they have normative weight. Viewed histori-
cally, they reflect the entire "higher law" thread in our understanding
of the American trial.72
The trial provides a richer and more engrossing encounter with the
realities of the case than affidavits, depositions, briefs, and appellate
records. More importantly, by absorbing the decisionmaking in the
details and the drama of the case, previous attitudes are refined and
disciplined so that the decisionmaker is exercising less discretion, and
is less arbitrary than a judge who can maintain more of a Cartesian
aloofness from the materials, and thus act more subjectively.
As G.K. Chesterton saw after his own jury service, the central con-
tribution of lay jurors is that they can still allow themselves to see
what the languages and performances of the trial show:
Many legalists have declared that the untrained jury should be alto-
gether supplanted by the trained Judge.
•.. [However] the more a man looks at a thing, the less he can see
it, and the more a man learns a thing the less he knows it.... [T]hat
the man who is trained should be the man who is trusted, would be
absolutely unanswerable if it were really true that a man who stud-
ied a thing and practiced it every day went on seeing more and more
of its significance. But he does not. He goes on seeing less and less
of its significance ....
Now it is a terrible business to mark a man out for the vengeance
of men. But it is a thing to which a man can grow accustomed, as he
can to other terrible things . . .. And the horrible thing about all
70. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 240-41 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d
ed. 1994) (citations omitted).
71. On the notion of "considered judgments of justice," see RAWLS, supra note 23.
72. See generally ABRAMSON, supra note 45, at 57-95; Harrington, supra note 17.
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legal officials, even the best, about all judges, magistrates, barristers,
detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of
them are good), not that they are stupid (several of them are quite
intelligent), it is simply that they have got used to it.
Strictly they do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the
usual man in the usual place. They do not see the awful court of
judgment; they only see their own workshop.73
Justice Abe Fortas put the same thought in more conventional
terms in the criminal context, though his basic point applies across the
spectrum of litigation: "[J]udges do become case-hardened. Judges
do sometimes tend, after many years, to take a somewhat jaundiced
view of defendants. Many trial judges tend to become a bit prosecu-
tion-minded. That's the basic justification for a jury."74
Let us accept the conservative formulation that the trial's "con-
sciously structured hybrid of languages and performances ' 75 guides
the interpretation of the legal rules applied to actual human events.
Are those interpretations and applications "lawful"? Are the moral
sources actualized by trial practices part of the law? I have argued
that they are. Just as Dworkin's moral principles "above" the law can
be understood as part of the law-and must be so understood if, in his
view, the law is to be determinate-so too the normative sources that
are realized in the practices of the trial court, themselves expressing
our considered judgments of justice, ought to be so considered. 76 To
the extent that they are so considered, and to the extent that actual
cases are decided without them, there will be less law and more discre-
tion. They inhere in the narrative, argumentative, and dramatic re-
sources embedded in the trial. They are not "principles" understood
as yet more general rules. But they fall under the "rule of recogni-
tion" that judges and jurors practically follow and defend as justifica-
tions for decisions at trial. Some of them, such as the right to cross-
examine and present evidence, are of constitutional dimension.
That the results of those processes cannot be exhaustively identified
ex ante does not itself preclude the trial's methods from the category
of law. Uncontroversially "legal" provisions in statutes and regula-
tions are often expressed in "factors," without a predetermined hier-
73. G.K. CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 83-86 (1909).
74. Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 213
(1972). For an illuminating account of the daily business in an American criminal trial court that
Chesterton would have appreciated, see STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND
THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE (2005).
75. BURNS, supra note 1, at 201.
76. 1 would use the now-fashionable term norm for these moral sources, but that term easily
leads to entitizing those sources, and suggesting that they can be realized, or strictly identified,
outside the practices that reveal them.
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archy or relative weight to be given by a decisionmaker to each one.
Professor Cass Sunstein described the decisionmaking process:
"Hence the decision-maker cannot rely simply on 'finding the facts'
and 'applying the law.' The content of the law is not given; part of it
must be found. There is a degree of ex post allocation of legal entitle-
ments. ' 77 Legal provisions expressed as "standards" will impose a
high burden of contextual interpretation, one that requires a range of
considerations before the meaning of the standard in the particular
case can be discerned.
III. THE TRIAL COURT AND TRUTH: Too MUCH OF THE
WRONG KIND OF LAW?
I now turn to another set of considerations that has led critics to
suggest that the trial court is not lawful based on the way it treats
factual78 issues-its alleged indifference to the truth. Although I do
not accept some of the central prescriptions of the two authors whose
arguments I recount, I freely concede the importance of this issue.
Factual accuracy relates directly to the rule of law. A court without
truth will be lawless, regardless of how perfectly the legal rules are
stated in the instructions. Without procedures that reliably allow the
judge or jury to accurately determine what has occurred, there is no
rule of law, understood narrowly as the "law of rules" or in the
broader sense I have sketched out.
If judges can manipulate factual findings to bring them within the
legal categories, the rule of law is observed only superficially. If
judges simply cannot determine what did or did not happen, litigants
are no better off. In neither case will the core values surrounding the
liberal version79 of the rule of law be realized. Citizens will not be
assured that they can protect themselves from intrusions of the state
into their freedom by avoiding the prohibitions of the law of rules, and
they will not be able to avail themselves of the assistance of the state
afforded by the rules of private law doctrines. Factual accuracy is es-
sential if the rule of law is to prevail in concrete cases.
77. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 964 (1995).
78. I can barely resist the urge to place scare quotes around the word "factual." (Those latter
quotes aren't scare quotes!) There is, of course, an enormous legal literature surrounding the
fact-law distinction, just as there is an enormous philosophical literature surrounding the analo-
gous is-ought distinction. One cannot take a step here without implicating the issues that litera-
ture addresses.
79. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
(1968) (noting that clear preexisting rules preserved the citizen's autonomy by restricting state
interference in the exercise of freedom).
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I will summarize below what two distinguished critics of the trial
court have said about its ability to achieve this basic goal. Although I
do not accept their skepticism about adversary practices at trial, their
accounts, especially as they bear on pretrial practices in cases where
"brutally elementary facts" are at issue, raise basic questions that de-
mand attention if the lawfulness of the trial court is to be enhanced. I
end with a set of questions that must be answered in order to move
forward intelligently.
In his magisterial history of the British adversary trial, Professor
John Langbein traces the history of the "lawyerization" of the crimi-
nal trial.80 He attributes the domination of the trial by lawyers, and
the relatively passive role of the judge, to a set of historical conditions
in British criminal trial procedure that prevailed in the eighteenth cen-
tury.8' The criminal trial at the turn of that century was different from
the trial as we know it today. Prosecutions were initiated by private
parties who brought their complaints to local justices of the peace.
Over time, the justices of the peace came to be partisans of the prose-
cution's case, rather than independent "truth-seekers. ' 82 Their role
was to create and preserve evidence that supported the prosecution.
They were precluded from searching for evidence that supported in-
nocence or even from examining "[w]itnesses that expressly [came] to
prove the Offender's Innocence."' 3 They conducted an examination
of the defendant (a "deposition") that was often used against the de-
fendant at trial. Langbein recounts the complaint of the defense
counsel at a 1787 Old Bailey trial that "[tihe Magistrates at Bow
Street never receive evidence for prisoners, only for prosecutors. '84
Langbein concludes that "[m]agisterial questioning functioned as po-
lice interrogation does today; it offered the government an opportu-
nity to get whatever information it could from an uncounseled, and
frequently frightened and confused, defendant. '85
The justices of the peace would routinely commit a defendant to jail
pending trial.86 The conditions were appalling-malnutrition and dis-
80. LANGBEIN, supra note 13.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 43.
83. Id. (quoting THEODORE BARLOW, THE JUSTICE OF PEACE: A TREATISE CONTAINING THE
POWER AND DUTY OF THAT MAGISTRATE 190 (1745)).
84. Id. (quoting D'arcy Wentworth, Old Bailey Sessions Papers (Dec. 1787, #8), at 15, 19).
85. Id. (quoting William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE
L.J. 393, 417 (1995)). In Langbein's view, as the nineteenth century wore on and professional
police forces took over the responsibility for assembling the prosecution's case, the justice of the
peace's investigation began to look increasingly like our preliminary hearing.
86. LANGBEIN, supra note 13, at 48-49.
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ease killed large numbers of detainees. 87 Prisoners, who were often
detained for months and who did not have the assistance of counsel,
were disgorged directly into the trial court:
Beattie's account.., of the ineptness that many felony defendants
displayed when attempting to defend themselves at trial, links their
predicament in part to the horrific jail conditions. "[Mien not used
to speaking in public who suddenly found themselves thrust into the
limelight before an audience in an unfamiliar setting-and who
were for the most part dirty, underfed, and surely often ill-did not
usually cross-examine vigorously or challenge the evidence
presented against them." The degradation and distraction of con-
finement continued into the courtroom; defendants were kept in leg
irons until called for trial.88
Defendants were prohibited from having a copy of the indictment ei-
ther before or at trial, and their imprisonment made it all but impossi-
ble for them to discover and organize evidence of their innocence.
Felonies were all capital crimes. Prosecution witnesses (known as
"thief-catchers") were paid handsome bounties for accusing the de-
fendant, and felons could escape the gallows by accusing others and
sending them to their deaths.89 The prosecution possessed compul-
sory process and the defense did not; defense witnesses were not per-
mitted to testify under oath.90 Trials were designed to pressure the
defendant into speaking in response to the prosecution's case, al-
though the defendant was prohibited from testifying under oath in
England until the late nineteenth century.91 Judges were satisfied that
they and the jury could distinguish truth from falsehood. Judges were
also much more active-overbearing by our sensibilities. They com-
mented on the evidence, interrogated the defendant and the jury in
what Langbein describes as the "altercation" style of trial, and forced
the jury to reconsider a verdict they thought was wrong.92
The adversarial trial as we know it today emerged over the eight-
eenth century as a series of specific reforms to this deeply unfair sys-
tem, which was either imported directly into the colonies or created
independently. At first, lawyers were permitted to assist the defen-
dant solely on points of law and were not permitted to address the
court or jury on the central issue of factual guilt or innocence. 93 The
87. Id. at 49.
88. Id. at 50 (second alteration in original) (quoting J.M. BEA-rTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS
IN ENGLAND 1660-1800, at 350-51 (1986)).
89. Id. at 148-65.
90. Id. at 51-52.
91. Id. at 52-53.
92. LANGBEIN, supra note 13, at 13-16.
93. Id. at 110.
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lethality of thief-catchers and codefendants eventually led judges to
permit lawyers to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, to call defense
witnesses, and finally to address the jury directly on the ultimate is-
sues. What Langbein descriptively calls the "accused speaks" trial
evolved into a proceeding where the defendant rarely spoke.94
The judges' relative ignorance of the facts of the case and the appar-
ent clumsiness of their questioning led them to cede more and more
authority to the lawyers who had investigated and prepared the case
and could thus present a coherent theory. 95 In the United States, ced-
ing an increasing level of responsibility for the presentation of the case
to the parties, and increasing restrictions on the trial judge, were con-
sistent with many of the democratic themes that emerged during the
colonial and revolutionary periods, especially as they bore on the sus-
picion of the trial judges. 96
Though he recognizes the unfairness of the pre-adversarial English
criminal trial, Langbein laments the shape that the Anglo-American
trial has taken as a result of the reforms of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries:
Two-sided partisanship may indeed have been better than one-
sided partisanship, but it was still a poor proxy for truth-seeking.
Adversary procedure entrusts the responsibility for gathering and
presenting the evidence upon which accurate adjudication depends
to partisans whose interest is in winning, not in truth .... The ad-
versary dynamic invited distortion and suppression of the evidence,
by permitting abusive and misleading cross-examination, the coach-
ing of witnesses, and the concealment of unfavorable evidence. This
attribute of adversary procedure, the combat effect, was worsened
by the wealth effect inherent in privatizing for hire the work of the
adversaries who gathered and presented the evidence. We recall
the chilling lament of the woman tried and sentenced to death for
forgery at the Old Bailey in 1757, who told the court: "I have not a
six penny piece left to pay a porter, much less [enough] to fee coun-
sel." For her, the message of adversary justice was that "I must die
because I am poor .... -97
Langbein criticized adversarial justice for its lack of "a coherent the-
ory of truth-seeking": "Adversary procedure presupposed that truth
would somehow emerge when no one was in charge of seeking it.
Truth was a byproduct."98 He critiques the failure of Anglo-American
94. Id. at 48-61.
95. Id. at 311-14.
96. See generally NELSON, supra note 22.
97. LANGBEIN, supra note 13, at 332-33 (second and third alteration in original) (quoting
Eleanor Eddacres, Old Bailey Sessions Papers (July 1787, # 285), at 263, 269).
98. Id. at 333.
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procedure to embrace the methods of reformed continental proce-
dure, where the judges have the authority to conduct their own pre-
trial investigations and guide the testimony of witnesses to achieve
truth, and a result consistent with the law. 99 As the quotation sug-
gests, he argues that the "combat effect" and the "wealth effect" con-
tinue to plague our trial system.
Professor William Pizzi, who was himself a prosecutor, picks up the
critique in the present day, and mourns the death of the truth in crimi-
nal trials at the hands of the combat effect in Trials Without Truth.100
He argues that our criminal trial system fails the three crucial tests of
any such system:
No trial system is strong and deserving of public respect (1) if it
cannot be trusted to acquit the innocent and convict the guilty with
a high degree of reliability; (2) if it fails to treat those who come in
contact with the system-including victims and witnesses as well as
suspects and defendants-with dignity and respect; and (3) if it fails
to make wise use of limited judicial resources.101
Pizzi believes our system fails the first requirement for a number of
reasons. The "basic metaphysics" of the American lawyer sees the
criminal trial as "two-sided contests between the state and the individ-
ual."10 2 Further, we are addicted to procedure, which is an odd kind
of counterweight to the harshness of the adversarial battle.10 3 Consti-
tutional criminal procedure drives the investigative police function
and the prosecutorial function too close together. Police and prosecu-
tors become a team whose goal is to produce convictions-not to dis-
cover the truth. Though largely ineffective in the most serious cases,
the exclusionary rule infects the professionals involved in the criminal
trial with an ethos of disregard for factual accuracy, which coheres
nicely with a personalized obsession with winning at all costs. Our
overblown privilege against self-incrimination-ineffective for all but
the wealthy, sophisticated, and hardened-deprives the court of any
access to the defendant as a reliable source of information about what
99. Continental systems do not really have "trials" in the American sense-presentations of
all the evidence on each side of a case. Rather, the judge has the authority to adjourn the formal
proceedings and conduct further investigations. It is a Prozess, to use the title of Kafka's often
mistranslated classic. FRANZ KAFKA, DER PROZESS (1935).
100. WILLIAM T. Pizzi, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS
HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO Do TO REBUILD IT (1999). He
has much less to say about the wealth effect.
101. Id. at 24.
102. Id. at 36.
103. Pizzi makes the running comparison of our trial process to American football, which he
unfavorably contrasts with soccer for the same reason. Id. at 5-24.
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has occurred.10 4 The requirement that defense counsel file an Anders
brief, and the lack of negative consequences for appealing an unfavor-
able verdict, encourage-indeed, all but mandate-appeals.
Evidentiary rules are complex and often fail to differentiate be-
tween reliable and unreliable evidence. 0 5 Even appellate courts use a
dismissive, "roll the dice" language in speaking of jury trials, and the
willingness of appellate courts to reverse for technical error paints a
picture of trials as "fragile and uncertain events in which any error...
may alter the outcome." 1 6 Trial judges have to walk on procedural
eggshells for fear of reversal. One result is the "vanishing trial" syn-
drome, which Pizzi notes when he contrasts American trials with the
more informal Dutch inquiries: "Obviously, we have made different
choices, preferring a much more elaborate and formal trial procedure
but only being able to use it for a very tiny percentage of criminal
cases. ' 10 7 Another result is the unwillingness of judges to provide ju-
rors the benefit of their experience on the bench by summarizing and
commenting on the evidence.
According to Pizzi, a major failure of our criminal litigation sys-
tem-one that Langbein anticipated-is the competitive pretrial dis-
covery system: "[O]ur trial system turns discovery of information
'from the other side' into a game in which one wants to get as much
information as possible but give as little as possible,"' 08 and where no
agency is responsible for gathering all the relevant information re-
gardless of whom it benefits. Trial procedures, such as tightly con-
trolled cross-examinations and the mandated question-and-answer
format of direct examination, keep the witness from telling the whole
truth in the witness's own words. Lawyers learn from actors and start
to think of the trial as theatre. An accelerating downward spiral oc-
curs when harsher criminal penalties and more strident defense advo-
cacy meet with the increasing power of prosecutors to force plea
bargains that judges fail to scrutinize:10 9
104. Pizzi is echoing the criticism that Marvin Frankel made a quarter of a century ago. MAR-
VIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980). Frankel, at the time a federal district court judge
and a political liberal, pointed out the contradiction between our overblown protections at trial,
where the refusal of the defendant to speak with the police cannot even be mentioned, and the
coercive realities of the police station. Id. at 87-100.
105. This is a point I generally agree with. See Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law,
supra note 40, at 87-89.
106. Pizzi, supra note 100, at 78.
107. Id. at 97.
108. Id. at 122. Of course, this magnifies the "wealth effect," allowing richer parties to more
effectively gather evidence. See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003).
109. Pizzi, supra note 100, at 191.
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When a country has an efficient trial system that puts a high priority
on truth and expects defendants to own up to what they have done
and accept responsibility, it is easier to maintain a high level of pub-
lic respect and confidence. That, in turn, permits the system to try
alternatives to incarceration that would not be politically possible in
the United States.110
Finally, the reality of "jury nullification makes a mockery of our whole
intricate trial system." ''
One can take issue with some of the conclusions drawn by Langbein
and Pizzi. The harmless error doctrine continues to grow, shielding
judges and prosecutors from reversible errors. With relatively few
streamlining devices-such as limits on jury selection methods, simpli-
fied evidence rules, and time limits for the presentation of cases 12-it
seems possible to conduct many more jury trials. In the hands of com-
petent practitioners, the conventions of direct and cross-examinations
can reveal both the strongest and weakest aspects of the witness's evi-
dence, as it bears on the issue before the jury. Americans in particular
have long been cautious of the power that judges may exercise when
"commenting" on evidence. I have my doubts that the long sentences
characteristic of American criminal justice are really the result of pop-
ular skepticism about adversarial criminal procedure. Pizzi quotes
Justice Byron White's invocation of Kalven and Zeisel:
[T]he most recent and exhaustive study of the jury in criminal cases
concluded that juries do understand the evidence and come to
sound conclusions in most of the cases presented to them and that
when juries differ with the result at which the judge would have
arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the very pur-
poses for which they were created and for which they are now
employed. 113
He rejects as a "mockery of our whole intricate trial system" what
he interprets as Justice White's veiled approval of jury nullification. 14
But Kalven and Zeisel's study, which probably exaggerated the differ-
ences between judge and jury,1 5 actually found that most of the dis-
110. Id. at 192.
111. Id. at 210.
112. Such time limits are, I believe, far more effective and democratic devices for focusing
trials than "micromanaging" evidence through exclusionary rules.
113. Pizzi, supra note 100, at 208-09 (alteration in original) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968)).
114. Id. at 210. Usually Pizzi is unhappy with the intricacy of the system; one might think he
would approve of a method that cuts through unnecessary intricacy.
115. Kalven and Zeisel asked the judges how they "would have" ruled in cases that went to
the juries and then compared their answers to the actual jury verdicts. Because this relieved the
judges of any pressure of the "equitable" considerations that they found largely motivate jurors,
it was likely to exaggerate the differences between judges and juries. Pizzi also implicitly accepts
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agreements between judge and jury occurred because of the different
ways they perceived the evidence-a much more subtle difference
consistent with "the democratization of inference"' 1 6 that the jury
right was meant to uphold, and not nullification "in the teeth of the
law."
Further, the American lawyer's "basic metaphysics" in the criminal
context has much to recommend it. The dominant utilitarian justifica-
tion for the criminal justice system, which has affected practice, has
always considered the defendants as tools for achieving a general so-
cial good, akin, in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's poignant meta-
phor, to the draftee being marched into battle with a bayonet at his
bottom. 1 7 Though Hart tried to distinguish the utilitarian "general
justifying aim" of the system from the retributive-distributive princi-
ple,11 8 this normative divide has not often found its way into practice.
Despite the empirical evidence that certainty of conviction is more
important than length of sentence, the severity of the punishment of
an individual has often been directly justified by the social need for
crime control. There can be little doubt that the English criminal jus-
tice system, as Langbein describes it, has historically had a strong pro-
prosecution bias.1 19 And at the deepest level, there may be something
darkly primitive about our social need to single out and condemn de-
viant individuals, a compulsion that our religious traditions have halt-
ingly attempted to counter.120 Notice, too, that Pizzi's complaint is
that there is too much law in the trial court. Our obsession with pro-
cedure and relatively complex legal rules defeats the truth-seeking im-
perative of the trial in a number of different ways. The exclusionary
rule, in theory, bars evidence even if it is reliable. Evidentiary rules,
by contrast, are usually justified by their power to ensure the reliabil-
ity of evidence and keep the trial inquiry focused on the issues legiti-
mized by the substantive law, but they can fail by virtue of inevitable
overgenerality and complexity.
Of course, Langbein's wealth effect can distort the trial because of
the effects of the surrounding market institutions within which the
a coincidence of "what the law requires" and "what the trial judge believes the law requires."
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 48, at 51-54.
116. I am indebted to Ronald Allen for this phrase.
117. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 43 (Little. Brown & Co. 1945)
(1923).
118. H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RE-
SPONSIBILITY, supra note 79, at 1, 8-11.
119. LANGBEIN, supra note 13.
120. See RENE GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED (Patrick Gregory trans., Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press 1977) (1972).
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trial takes place. If parties had equal resources to pay legal fees (or
the insurance to pay them), the wealth effect would disappear. I have
no doubt that the wealth effect, especially at the pretrial stage, can
distort the accuracy of trial decisionmaking and therefore endanger
the rule of law in the trial court. Serious reform efforts, which will be
quite different in the civil and criminal contexts, and which will re-
quire the greatest imagination and political will, are necessary.
The trial's practices and languages are less autonomous and more
dependent on the market and bureaucratic institutions when their task
is to determine "brutally elementary data.' 121 These are not the
meaning of events, but the basic perceptual "data" in some cases, such
as criminal cases where identity is the key issue. Underfunded,
sloppy, or deliberately deceitful behavior at the pretrial stage can pro-
duce skewed verdicts at trial, as can formally inadequate discovery
methods, such as the lack of any compulsory pretrial deposition prac-
tice in most criminal cases, and realities such as the crushing case
loads in public defenders' offices. Most of the failures of the rule of
law that occur because trials are "without truth" stem from these
sources. The uneven skills of trial lawyers, assuming a threshold of
competence, are less likely to have an effect.
The evaluation of the combat effect is more difficult. It may, of
course, be viewed solely as a function of the wealth effect, because
lawyers for the party best able to reward them will do more of the bad
things that distort the truth. But if taken independently of that effect,
its broadest claim is that under the conditions that prevail in litigated
cases, the presentation and mutual critique of two interested parties
are less able to allow the truth to appear to a "passive" and disinter-
ested judge or jury than the sustained inquiry of a single focused in-
vestigator. But is it really so clear that truth is most likely to emerge
to a single mind directly seeking it than to a disinterested judge or jury
hearing the best case to be presented on each side? If the essence of
procedural justice is audiatur et altera pars,122 is it not more likely that
the other side will be heard when it is urged by an advocate whose
energies are directed to making it heard?
We return to our problem of mixed ideality here. Much, although
not all, of the criticism of excessive adversarialism points to conduct
121. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards
for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1281 (2004) (stressing
the special importance of this range of cases).
122. Roughly, this means "the other side must be heard." See Mauro Cappelletti, Fundamen-
tal Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation: Comparative Constitutional, International, and
Social Trends, 25 STAN. L. REV. 651, 652 (1973) (defining the phrase as "the right of defense").
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that is misconduct under current procedural and ethical norms. This is
conduct that our legal rules have not been able to control. Because it
is skeptical of state power, our tradition generally resists comparing
that conduct with the idealized inquiry of an inquisitorial judge. Pizzi
makes a compelling case for the circularity of the pathology of the
criminal justice system, but the moderate reformist problem is how to
cut into that pathology without making things worse. For example,
can we realistically expect the police to adopt a more detached style,
unconcerned about convictions, if we just relax the privilege against
self-incrimination? Pizzi's argument that most of the difficulty occurs
at the pretrial stage is convincing.12 3 How much of the problem is the
result of the wealth effect and how much is the result of the combat
effect? Is there a way of equalizing the access of both parties to the
evidence? Should we rely on competitive fact-finding and "sharing"
through greater discovery or on nonadversary investigation by neutral
agencies? What would the latter look like concretely?
IV. CONCLUSION
Throughout our legal history, judges and juries have relied on a va-
riety of moral sources. That history points in many directions. There
are historical sources that elevate the importance of the mechanical
application of clear preexistent norms with little regard for contextual
equities and hold, as Justice William Rehnquist put it, that "[s]imple
justice is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a pe-
riod of years is evenhandedly applied. ' 124 There is likewise significant
support for a view that the jury's search for moral sources beyond
what can be deduced from the law of rules is legitimate. The general
trend of the nineteenth century was to elevate the former view. The
twentieth century presents a much more mixed picture. The expan-
sion of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, the selective incorpora-
tion of ever more aggressive interpretations of the criminal jury
provisions of the Bill of Rights, and the liberalization of pleading and
the law of evidence, all expanded the jury's role in adjudication, and
so almost certainly broaden the moral sources on which our trial
courts rely. We stand in an interpretive relationship with this history
and the best account of it will depend on our own normative assess-
ment of the contemporary trial and our own historically informed
judgment about how to go forward.
123. Pizzi, supra note 100, at 59-68, 122.
124. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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At the beginning of this Article, I asked whether the trial court was
a dangerous place for the rule of law. The answer depends in large
part on one's notions of the rule of law and the consciously structured
hybrid of languages and practices that makes up the American trial. I
have argued that one's notion of the rule of law is enriched by under-
standing the ways of the trial court. I have suggested that what
emerges from that understanding is a notion of law that remains in
touch with its constitutive relationship to justice and is consistent with
the social structure that we have framed for ourselves. In our world,
highly contextual judgments of relative importance of competing con-
siderations are essential. Dworkin is broadly right in arguing that the
best account of what we do at trial is accomplished by the richest legal
philosophy.12 5 He is also right that the richest legal philosophy will
take into account our best practices.' 2 6 This is circular-as are all im-
portant interpretive questions.
My view remains that the trial's linguistic performances are unpar-
alleled in hammering out the meanings of human events, and then
determining which of those inevitably multiple meanings is the most
important. The meanings are multiple because the significance of the
event will vary from the perspectives of the different social spheres
within which it is situated. Events being tried will usually involve a
family, a neighborhood, a religious community, an interest group po-
litical community, a political party, a legal order, or a market mecha-
nism. 27 These are not only intellectual constructs. We really divide
our society into these spheres. They are the forms of life within which
we live and move and have our being. They have corresponding
modes of social ordering and our ways of speaking are grounded in
them. I have argued that the importance of the trial for us is precisely
its ability to mediate among these spheres without the possibility of an
Archimedean position. Thus, "[o]ur task is less to create constantly
new forms of life than to creatively renew actual forms by taking ad-
vantage of their internal multiplicity and tensions and their friction
with one another."'1 28 In order to accomplish this task, the jury 29
must be able to dwell in the enormous tension that the hybrid dis-
courses create at trial.
125. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 410-13 (1986).
126. Id.
127. BURNS, supra note 1, at 201.
128. DAVID KOLB, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE MODERNITY: HEGEL, HEIDEGGER AND AFTER
259 (1986).
129. I use the word "jury" to apply to the decisionmaker at trial solely for ease of reference.
My remarks apply equally to bench trials and jury trials.
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Philosophers have argued that we, actually do this and its result can
be fairly called knowledge: "[We achieve insight by making] some-
thing appear by juxtaposing images or, even harder to explain, by jux-
taposing words. The epiphany comes from between the words or
images, as it were, from the force field they set up between them, and
not through a central referent which they describe . . . . ,3 What the
jury understands is "a juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of
changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator,
essential core, or generative first principle. ' 131 The meanings that the
trial reveals are the most important meanings for purposes of public
judgment and action, most likely to allow the decisionmaking to effect
the law's purposes and to achieve what an older idiom called "true
law."132
130. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 465-66.
131. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW CONSTELLATION: THE ETHICAL-POLITICAL HORI-
ZONS OF MODERNITY/POSTMODERNITY 201 (MIT Press 1992) (1991) (quoting MARTIN JAY,
ADORNO 14-15 (1984)).
132. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANG-
ING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 47 (1994).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:307
